

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 04183 01 OF 02 071005Z

12

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00

INRE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01

PRS-01 SS-15 NEA-10 TRSE-00 MBFR-04 SAJ-01 IO-13

AEC-11 ACDA-19 OMB-01 DRC-01 /139 W

----- 031072

O R 070845Z SEP 73

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1457

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 4183

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MBFR: TEXT OF IS DRAFT OF SECTION III (NEGOTIATING STRATEGY)

1. INTERNATIONAL STAFF'S DRAFT OF SECTION III OF NEGOTIATING STRATEGY AS IT EMERGED FROM DISCUSSION IN SENIOR POLADS ON SEPTEMBER 5 FOLLOWS BELOW. SEE SEPTTEL FOR MISSION'S COMMENTS.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

III. NEGOTIATING STRATEGY

INTRODUCTION

1. THIS SECTION CONTAINS ALLIED THINKING ON THE STRATEGY OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE INITIAL STAGE OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, (I.E., THE FIRST TWO TO FOUR MONTHS). IN PARTICULAR IT DISCUSSES THE MAJOR STEPS IN PRESENTATION OF THE ALLIED POSITION TO THE EAST, AS WELL AS THE QUESTIONS OF WHEN AND HOW THOSE STEPS WOULD BE TAKEN.

2. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE AT THIS TIME TO FORESEE THE ENTIRE COURSE
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 04183 01 OF 02 071005Z

OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS OR TO DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR THE WHOLE NEGOTIATION. THE COMPLEXITY OF THE SUBJECT MATTER AND THE SCARCITY OF AUTHORITATIVE INFORMATION ON SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN NEGOTIATING POSITIONS PRECLUDE THIS.

3. AT THE OUTSET OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS WILL, IN FACT, BE UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE EAST'S ATTITUDES AND INTENTIONS. DISCUSSION WITH THE EAST WILL ADD TO ALLIED KNOWLEDGE OF THE WARSAW PACT'S OBJECTIVES, WILL REVEAL SOME OF ITS STRATEGY AND COULD THEREFORE HAVE AN EFFECT UPON THE ATTITUDES TO BE TAKEN BY THE ALLIES. IT WOULD BE IMPRACTICAL UNDER THESE CONDITIONS FOR NATO TO SEEK TO DEFINE IN DETAIL ITS STRATEGY FOR MORE THAN THE INITIAL STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. BEYOND THAT, THINKING ON STRATEGY MUST IN THE NATURE OF THINGS REMAIN OPEN.

4. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, THE ALLIES ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO A NEGOTIATING STRATEGY WHICH REQUIRES FREQUENT SHIFTS IN THEIR BASIC POSITION. WHILE IT MIGHT BE THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE TO BUILD A SERIES OF POSITIONS AND FALLBACKS IN ORDER TO MAXIMISE TRADING ROOM, SUCH AN APPROACH WILL NOT BE FEASIBLE FOR A LARGE, COMPLEX MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION LIKE MBFR. ALLIED UNITY, WHICH WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF OUR COMMON PURPOSES IN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, WILL REQUIRE CO-ORDINATION OF NEGOTIATING POSITIONS, AND SUCH CO-ORDINATION NECESSARILY TAKES TIME. WESTERN COUNTRIES WILL FIND IT NECESSARY TO EXPLAIN THEIR NEGOTIATING POSITION TO PARLIAMENTS, AND IN LESSER DETAIL TO PUBLIC OPINION. AN INITIAL POSITION WITH SUBSTANTIAL ADDITIONAL DEMANDS ON THE OTHER SIDE WOULD NOT BE PLAUSIBLE, AND FREQUENT SHIFTS TO FALLBACK POSITIONS WOULD BE CONFUSING AND UNDERMINE CONFIDENCE. MOREOVER, IF THE WEST WERE TO ATTEMPT TO BARGAIN FROM DELIBERATELY INFLATED POSITIONS, IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO KEEP THE ALLIED STRATEGY AND ITS FALLBACKS FROM BECOMING KNOWN TO THE EAST. AT THE END OF SUCH A PROCESS, THE WEST WOULD STILL HAVE TO FACE THE PROBLEM OF PERSUADING THE EAST THAT ITS BASIC POSITION WAS IN FACT SERIOUSLY INTENDED.

5. TAKING THESE FACTORS INTO ACCOUNT, THE MOST EFFECTIVE GENERAL APPROACH TO THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE TO TAKE A FIRM BASIC POSITION AND TO STICK TO IT AS THE WESTERN SIDE ATTEMPTS TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATION THROUGH DIFFERENT LEVELS OF GENERALISATION DOWN TO THE SPECIFICS OF ACTUAL AGREEMENT. IT WILL BE A CARDINAL
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 04183 01 OF 02 071005Z

POINT OF NEGOTIATING STRATEGY FOR THE ALLIES TO MAINTAIN THEIR AGREED POSITION WITH MAXIMUM CONSISTENCY, DETERMINATION AND PERSEVERANCE.

6. THE INITIAL STAGE (-WHICH WOULD PRESUMABLY LAST SOME TWO TO FOUR MONTHS -) WOULD INCLUDE THE PRESENTATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF GENERAL VIEWPOINTS ON BOTH SIDES, EXPLORATION OF ATTITUDES, AND THE PRESENTATION OF THE ALLIED FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL. SINCE THE WESTERN COUNTRIES ARE THE INVITING PARTY, BOTH THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES AND WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION WOULD EXPECT THE ALLIES TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN ADVANCING SUGGESTIONS, AND IT WOULD BE IN THE WESTERN INTEREST TO DO SO. THE INITIAL STAGE WOULD CULMINATE WITH AN EFFORT TO ENGAGE THE SOVIETS IN A NEGOTIATION LEADING TO

PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS.

STEPS IN INITIAL STAGE

7. THE INITIAL STAGE OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WOULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING MAJOR STEPS:

8. OPENING STATEMENTS. OPENING STATEMENTS IN PLENARY SESSION WOULD BE OF A GENERAL, PROGRAMMATIC CHARACTER. THEY WOULD BE BASED UPON AGREED ALLIANCE POLICY WITH THE DETAILS CO-ORDINATED IN THE AD HOC GROUP IN MEETINGS STARTING IN BRUSSELS PRIOR TO THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON OCTOBER 30TH.

9. THEMATIC MATERIAL FOR THE OPENING STATEMENTS SHOULD BE SUCH THAT IT WILL

- BE SUPPORTED BY ALL ALLIED PARTICIPANTS;
- DRIVE THE NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD OUTCOMES PREFERRED BY THE ALLIES;
- BE CREDIBLE AND DEFENDABLE VIS-A-VIS THE OTHER SIDE;
- BE REASONABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE IN THE EYES OF WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION;
- LEAVE ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE AND REFINEMENTS DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS.

10. DEVELOPMENT OF MAIN THEMES. AFTER THE FIRST ROUND OF OPENING STATEMENTS, FURTHER PLENARY SESSIONS WOULD BE DEVOTED TO PRESENTATIONS DEVELOPING THE MAIN THEMES OF THE WESTERN STATEMENTS, INCLUDING SUCH MATTERS AS ASYMMETRIES IN THE MILITARY SITUATIONS OF EAST AND WEST, THREATENING ELEMENTS, THE NEED FOR PARITY AND A SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 04183 01 OF 02 071005Z

COMMON CEILING. THIS DEVELOPMENT OF MAIN THEMES WILL DESCRIBE THE OVERALL PROBLEM AS THE ALLIES SEE IT AND WILL DEFINE AND EMPHASIZE THE GENERAL CONCEPTS ON WHICH THE ALLIES WILL REPLY IN THE FURTHER STAGES OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. IT WILL SET FORTH THE CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT IN WHICH SPECIFIC ALLIED PROPOSALS WILL LATER BE DEVELOPED.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 04183 02 OF 02 071025Z

11

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00

INRE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01

PRS-01 SS-15 NEA-10 TRSE-00 MBFR-04 SAJ-01 IO-13

AEC-11 ACDA-19 OMB-01 DRC-01 /139 W

----- 031202

O R 070845Z SEP 73
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1458
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 4183

11. THE EAST FOR ITS PART WILL PROBABLY ALSO FOLLOW UP ITS OPENING STATEMENTS WITH FURTHER ELABORATION. THIS EXCHANGE OF AMPLIFYING STATEMENTS WILL PROVIDE A BASIS FOR A GENERAL EXPLORATION OF EACH SIDE'S VIEWPOINT.

12. FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL. THE NEXT STEP WOULD BE TO TIE TOGETHER THE STRANDS DEVELOPED IN THE EXPOSITION OF MAJOR THEMES BY THE INITIAL PRESENTATION OF AN ALLIED FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL. IT WOULD INCLUDE THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT AND THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE FIRST-PHASE REDUCTIONS ALONG THE LINES DESCRIBED IN SECTION II OF THIS PAPER.

13. AT THIS POINT, THE WESTERN PRESENTATION WOULD STILL BE IN GENERAL TERMS AND WE WOULD NOT EXPECT THE EAST TO REACT TO IT IN A DEFINITIVE MANNER. PRECISELY HOW SPECIFIC THE ALLIES WILL BE IN ILLUSTRATING THIS INITIAL PRESENTATION OF THE ALLIED FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL WITH ACTUAL NUMBERS DRAWN FROM THE POSITION DESCRIBED IN SECTION II WILL DEPEND UPON THE TACTICAL SITUATION WHICH OBTAINS AT THAT TIME. AT THIS POINT, THE ALLIES BELIEVE THAT THIS PRESENTATION SHOULD NOT GO ANY FURTHER INTO DETAIL ON
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 04183 02 OF 02 071025Z

THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THEIR POSITION THAN IS REQUIRED TO INDICATE THE PARAMETERS OF THEIR POSITION, (E.G., THE COMMON CEILING OBJECTIVE, THE 700,000 MAN FIGURE FOR THE COMMON CEILING OBJECTIVE, (THE TANK ARMY)(TU) AND THE 15 PERCENT FIGURES FOR THE FIRST PHASE.) OR (BY PUTTING FORWARD THE CONCEPT OF AN EVENTUAL COMMON CEILING BUT WITHOUT SPECIFYING EXACTLY WHAT THE LEVEL OF THIS COMMON CEILING WOULD BE. (IN ADVANCING THE IDEA OF AN EVENTUAL COMMON CEILING, WESTERN NEGOTIATORS SHOULD INDICATE THAT IT COULD NOT BE CALCULATED ON A BASIS OF MANPOWER ALONE BUT THAT OTHER ELEMENTS, E.G. TANKS, NEED TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.) IN ADDITION TO THE NOTION OF AN EVENTUAL COMMON CEILING, WESTERN NEGOTIATORS WOULD INCLUDE IN THEIR INITIAL FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL THE PARAMETERS OF THE FIRST PHASE, I.E. (THE SOVIET TANK ARMY AND)(TU) THE 15 PERCENT US REDUCTIONS. BUT A FINAL DECISION ON WHICH FIGURES SHOULD BE TABLED AT PARTICULAR POINTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS NEED NOT BE TAKEN NOW.)

14. PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS. THE ALLIES WOULD THEN MOVE TO MORE DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE COMPONENTS OF THEIR FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL. THE FIRST TOPIC TO BE TREATED IN MORE DETAIL THAN HAD

BEEN DONE BEFORE WOULD BE PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS. THE ALLIES WOULD ENGAGE IN A VIGOROUS EFFORT TO PROBE SOVIET ATTITUDES ON THE TOPIC AND TO GET THE SOVIETS INTO NEGOTIATION OF AN AGREEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT. IT WILL BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO HAVE FIRST SKETCHED OUT THE GENERAL CONTEXT OF THE ALLIES' OVERALL POSITION IN WHICH THE PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS WOULD FIND THEIR PLACE; THE ALLIES WOULD THUS HAVE ANTICIPATED PROBABLE SOVIET RELUCTANCE TO ADDRESS CONSTRAINTS WITHOUT REGARD TO REDUCTIONS. DEPENDING ON HOW THE EAST REACTS, THE ALLIES WILL MAKE AN ASSESSMENT OF WHETHER IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO REACH EARLY AGREEMENT ON PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS. IF SUCH AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE, THE ALLIES WILL MAKE A FURTHER DETERMINATION OF WHAT DEGREE OF FORMALITY MAY BE POSSIBLE FOR SUCH AN AGREEMENT.

15. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS TOPIC WOULD CONCLUDE THE INITIAL STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AS THE ALLIES CONCEIVE IT. THE NEXT STEP OF THE NEGOTIATION WOULD BE A DETAILED AND INTENSIVE PRESENTATION OF ALLIED PROPOSALS FOR THE FIRST-PHASE REDUCTIONS, INCLUDING CONCERTED JUSTIFICATION AND ADVOCACY OF THE WHOLE REDUCTION PROGRAMME (LEADING TO THE COMMON CEILING OBJECTIVE) OR (SEEKING TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE COMMON CEILING
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 04183 02 OF 02 071025Z

OBJECTIVE).

16. PROCEDURES AND AGENDA. THE ALLIES (WOULD TRY TO REACH AGREEMENT ON AN AGENDA ALTHOUGH THEY)(IT) WOULD NOT SEEK TO MAKE A SEPARATE STAGE OR STEP OF A DISCUSSION OF PROCEDURES OR AGENDA, LEST SOME OF THE SATISFACTORY RESULTS OF THE VIENNA PREPARATORY TALKS BE PUT AT HAZARD.

17. IN PARTICULAR, THE ALLIES WOULD RESIST ANY EASTERN ATTEMPT TO INVITE OTHER COUNTRIES TO JOIN THE TALKS OR TO RENEW THEIR PROPOSAL TO USE A SINGLE WORKING GROUP AS A VEHICLE FOR NARROWING THE EXISTING SCOPE OF ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ONLY TO THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

18. REGARDLESS OF THE SEQUENCE OF MAIN TOPICS DECIDED ON BY THE ALLIES FOR THE INITIAL STAGE, IT WOULD APPEAR (FRUITLESS) OR (DESIRABLE) (IT) TO SEEK TO OBTAIN EASTERN AGREEMENT ON AN AGENDA INCORPORATING THIS SEQUENCE. CERTAIN POINTS, SUCH AS THE MODALITIES OF THE PRESENTATION OF OPENING STATEMENTS BY BOTH SIDES AND A SUBSEQUENT PHASE OF DEVELOPMENT OF MAIN THEMES FROM THESE STATEMENTS, WOULD NOT BE CONTROVERSIAL AND COULD BE SETTLED INFORMALLY PRIOR TO THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS ON OCTOBER 30TH. (BUT) OR (IF) (IT) EFFORTS TO GAIN SOVIET CONCURRENCE TO INCLUDE, IN AN AGREED AGENDA, TOPICS SUCH AS THE ALLIED FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL OR INDIVIDUAL ITEMS LIKE THE COMMON CEILING OR PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS (WOULD BE UNPRODUCTIVE. MOREOVER, SUCH EFFORTS ARE UNNECESSARY.) OR (WOULD PROVE UNPRODUCTIVE, SUCH EFFORTS SHOULD BE ABANDONED. IN THIS CASE, WE WOULD RECALL THAT IT WAS AGREED ...) (IT) IT WAS AGREED IN THE VIENNA TALKS THAT EITHER

SIDE COULD RAISE MATTERS OF INTEREST TO IT WITHOUT PROCEDURAL OBJECTION BEING RAISED. THE ALLIES THEREFORE MAY PRESENT ANY GIVEN SUBJECT INCLUDING THEIR FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL AS ONE THEY INTEND TO DISCUSS AND NEGOTIATE ON. THE WARSAW PACT CAN DO THE SAME. THERE PROBABLY WILL BE DISAGREEMENT WITH THE EAST AS TO THE SEQUENCE IN WHICH TOPICS TABLED BY BOTH SIDES WILL BE HANDLED. THIS MIGHT BE RESOLVED DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH USE OF THE CONCEPT THAT AGREEMENT SHOULD BE SOUGHT TO PERMIT EACH SIDE TO DEVELOP POINTS OF GREATEST INTEREST TO IT IN PARALLEL. THE WEST COULD THEN ATTEMPT TO BRING THE EAST TO PARTICIPATE IN DETAILED DISCUSSION OF PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS IN RETURN FOR ALLIED AGREEMENT TO DEAL WITH REDUCTIONS NEXT.

SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 04183 02 OF 02 071025Z

IV. NEGOTIATING PROCEDURES

(SEE BENELUX PAPER OF 13TH JULY; AND UK STEERING BRIEF OF 18TH JULY.)

V. INTRA-ALLIANCE CO-ORDINATION

(PO(72)413, APPROPRIATELY REVISED, TAKING ACCOUNT, I.A., THE BENELUX PAPER OF 13TH AND THE UK PAPER OF 18TH JULY.)

END TEXT.

RUMSFELD

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 02 APR 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 07 SEP 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: garlanwa
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973NATO04183
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19730962/abqcebxh.tel
Line Count: 300
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: garlanwa
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 24 SEP 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <24-Sep-2001 by boyleja>; APPROVED <26-Nov-2001 by garlanwa>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: n/a
TAGS: MBFR: TEXT OF IS DRAFT OF SECTION III (NEGOTIATING STRATEGY)
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005